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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to occupy the position in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Essential context: ever since Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a respectful address, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, similar to the Socialists, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, like his predecessors, finished.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So is there a way out? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would lose seats, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that cultural shift will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”